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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. Review of the Literature
The war in Vietnam has brought to the forefront
many questions relating to the study of public opinion and
foreign policy.

Certainly, the most important question

raised has been the manner in which public opinion as it
relates to foreign policy should be investigated.

The

major limitation in this respect has been the absence of
sound theoretical frameworks in which the researcher can
posit his findings and, thereby, add to our understanding
of the relationship between public opinion and foreign
policy.

Therefore, the major objective of the present

study is to offer some suggestions as to how public opinion
on the issue of Vietnam should be examined.
James N. Rosenau has constructed a model through
which various issue-areas can be studied in terms of the
processes through which they are channeled.

Rosenau

m,aintains that there exist essential differences beteen
the domestic and foreign policy issue processes.

•e

former is characterized as a horizontal process whereas
the latter is pri..np;rily vertical in nature.

The

horizontal process involves a large array of opinion-leaders
1

ro,

2
because domestic issues "unfold under conditions of
scarce resources. al

Foreign policy Issues, on the other

hand, do not "require the participants to treat each other
as rivals for scarce resources," because as Rosenau points
out "foreign policy issues focus primarily on resources
and relationships that are to be distributed or rearranged
in the environment, whereas domestic issues involve mainly
distributions and rearrangements among members of the
system."2
The domestic-foreign policy issue-area mcdel lends
itself to the study of public opinion.

Research by Gabriel

Almond suggests that there are major differences between
public opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues.

The

differences closely resemble those proposed by Rosenau.
The size of the public interested in foreign policy issues
increases (or one might say becomes more horizontal) as these
issues become personalized.

Primary among the influences

that create personalization is the extent to which issues
'James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue
Area," in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. by James N.
Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 196-7), p. 45. Also,
related to this topic is a theory of the flow of opinions
formulated by the same author. See James N. Rosenau,
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House,
1961).
2Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area,"

p. 44.
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enter into the immediate environment of the
pub1ic.3

The

more one perceives an issue to have an immed
iate bearing
upon his existence the higher is the degree
of
personalization.

As the degree of personalization

increases the saliency of the issue for the
individual Is
heightened.
Almond indicates that such domestic issues as
reducing the "cost-of-living", strikes and housi
ng problems
evoke higher degrees of saliency from the Ameri
can public
than do issues of foreign affairs.4

On the basis of

Rosenau's model, it could be inferred that salie
ncy is the
result of various groups and individuals vying
for their
share of resources.

Therefore, the saliency of an issue

is much greater in the domestic political proce
ss than in
the foreign policy process.
A number of propositions can be deduced from the
foregoing discussion.
1.

These propositions are as follows:

Domestic issues are more salient than foreign
policy issues because they deal with the
redistribution of resources within the
internal political environment.

3Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Forei
gn
Policy, (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger,
17717—p. 53 and
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The
Civic Culture
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1963),
p. 161. For an in depth discussion of the
relationship
between the environment and public opini
on, see Walter
Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Macmi
llan Company,
1961).
4
A1mond, The American People, p. 79.
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2.

Foreign policy issues are less salient than
domestic issues because they deal to a greater
degree with the redistribution of resources
outside of the internal political system.

3.

Participation on the part of opinion-leaders
and the public in general in domestic
issue-areas will be higher than in foreign
policy issue-areas.

It should be emphasized that these propositions
hinge upon the degree of personalization of the issues.5
The existence of a domestic issue does not necessarily
mean that it will be salient.

The likelihood, however,

that a domestic issue will become highly salient is much
greater than the possibility of a foreign policy issue
becoming salient, due to the probability that the domestic
issue will become personalized.

Furthermore, the

personalization of an issue may result from the perceived
encroachment of an issue upon the immediate environment
of the public rather than a real encroachment.
Both the three propositions and the foregoing
discussion of personalization are best exemplified in
the following decision table.
One overriding question that relates to the study
of public opinion on Vietnam is whether Vietnam should be
examined as a domestic or foreign policy issue-area.
-r-

5The term personalization as it is used in this
paper is not synonymous with the term saliency. The
relationship between the two terms is best characterized
as being isomorphic. Another word that could have been
used to express the meaning desired is internalization.

The research that has already been executed in this area
has been based on the assumption that Vietnam is a foreign
policy issue-area and, therefore, viewed the structure of
opinion on this issue as essentially the same as on previous
foreign policy issues.

Conditions:

TABLE 1.1

Has the issue become
personalized?
Domestic issue?
Foreisin Policy issue?

YES

YES

NO

YTS
YES

Actions:
High Saliency
Low Saliency

X

X

High Participation
Low Participation

X

X
X

In order to determine in some absolute fashion
whether public opinion on Vietnam should be studied as a
foreign policy issue-area it would be necessary to test a
rather large number of variables.

Some insight can be

gained, however, by studying one or two of these variables.
Since it has generally been accepted that Presidential
action has the effect of increasing the President's support

6
6

in the area of foreign policy,

it was believed than an

investigation of the relationship between these two
variables (Presidential action and popular support) in the
ase of Vietnam might aid in determining if Vietnam should
be viewed as a domestic or a foreign policy issue-area.

If

Presidential action is not a significant determinant of
popular support, then Vietnam might possibly best be viewed
as a domestic issue-area since Presidential action only
slightly 1 -,fluences popular support on domestic Issues.
The effect of Presidential action has been examined
before and the conclusion reached that It has had a
significant effect on support for Presidential policy in
Vietnam.7

Furthermore, popular support was found not to

be contingent upon the direction of the action as is
demonstrated by the statement that it "appears . . . that
approval ratings go up as long as Johnson does something,

6For examples of this argument see, August
Heckscher, "Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of
Vietnam," The American Scholar, XXXV (Autumn, 1966),
614; Almond, The American People, p. 105; and Kenneth
N. Waltz, "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crisis,"
In Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. by James N.
Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967,) pp. 263 and 273.
7Seymour Martin Lipset, "Doves, Hawks: and Polls,"
Encounter, October, 1966, p. 44; Jchn P. Robinson and
Solomon G. Jacobson, "American Public Opinion About
Vietnam," in Vietnam: Some Basic Issues and Alternative,
ed. by Walter Isard (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman
Publishing Company, 1969), p. 63; and Sidney Verba et als t
"Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," American
Political Science Review, LXI (June, 1967), D. 333.
•
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whether it is more militaristic or more pacifistic."

Moreover, this same contention was used by S. M. Lipset
as the foundation for stating a proposition to the effect
that "Polls do not make policy so much as follow policy
in most areas of International affairs."9
All of the Vietnam studies concluding that
Presidential action has had a significant effect on
popular support have the common characteristic of examining
several Presidential actions and the support ratings after
these actions occur as the basis for the conclusions
reached.

This type of methodology is adequate for

explaining these particular actions and the subsequent
approval ratings.

It does not, however, lend itself to the

formulation of general propositions about the relationnip
between Presidential action and public opinion on matters
of foreign policy.

Perhaps, a better method would have

been a longitudinal study.

This, however, was not

applicable at the time these studies were executed (1966).
Not only did the method of testing the relationship cause
the findings to be weak in their ability to generate
propositions about public opinion and foreign policy, but
more essentially the question of whether Vietnam should be
analyzed as a foreign policy Issue-area was never once
raised.
Robinson and Jacobson, "American Public Cpinion

• • • , p. 68.
/Upset, "Doves, Hawks, and Polls," p. 38.

8
The present study has attempted to overcome the
deficiencies of previous studies in two ways:

First, by

using longitudinal analysis to test the relationship
between Presidential action and popular support for
Vietnam policy, secondly an attempt has been made to
ascertain whether public opinion on Vietnam should be
analyzed as a domestic or foreign policy issue-area on
the basis of Rosenau's domestic-foreign policy issue-area
model.
II. HYPOTHESIS
Explicitly stated the hypothesis that was tested
was as follows:

The relationship between Presidential

action and an increase in public support for the President
on matters of Vietnam policy is equal to zero.
Presidential action was viewed as any major
development in Policy (whether it be military or political)
toward the war.

Furthermore, any major speech by the

President or other high governmental official reaffirming
the government's course of action was posited into the
category of Presidential action.

In order for the speech

to be considered "major" it either had to have been
broadcast over nationwide television or widely disseminated
In the press.
14.

American public opinion is here defined as

the views expressed by those individuals interviewed by
the Gallup Poll.

These views will be considered

representative of the opinions held by the larger
American public_.

CHAPTER II
KETHODOLOGY
Data for this study are drawn almost entirely from
the International Roper Data Library Association.
surveys have been analyzed;
Polls.

Four

all four of which are Gallup

Consecuently, a few words of explanation are in

order relative to the Problems arising from the use of
Gallup data.
Obviously, the use of secondary data presents some
problems that would not arise if the researcher collected
his own data.

In the case of the use of the Gallup Polls

two basic problems arose.

First, there is a certain amount

of uncertainty among social scientists as to the sampling
techniques used by the Gallup organization.

Secondly, since

the present study is of a longitudinal nature the same
questions relative to the Vietnam War had to be asked with
some regularity during the years under study so that
comparisons could be made.

This presented a particular

problem in the present study.

Since the question "Do you

approve or disapprove of the way President Johnson is
handling the situation in Vietnam?"

was not included in

Gallup surveys with any regularity until July, 1965, the
period under consideration had to begin at this point.
9

10
For various reasons, which will be discussed later, the
"handling of the situation" question was the only one
believed applicable for the purposes of testing Ho.
Furthermore, since there is inconsistency in Gallup
surveys with respect to questions all four surveys will not
always be reported.

Unless otherwise stipulated this is

because the pertinent questions were not contained in all
four surveys.
The aforementioned problem of sampling technique
needed to be examined before the decision to use the Gallup
data was made.

Information on this subject is not abundant;

however, enough information is available to enable the
researcher to make some judgement as to the nature of the
Gallup organization's sampling methods.

Since the early

1950's Gallup has used a probability sample.

The sample is

in the form of an area/cluster random sample.1

Samples,

however, are inflated due to a weighting procedure to
compensate for not-at-homes since call-backs are not
normally attempted.

Gallup suggests that the unweighted

sample be used when tests of significance are made.

9ut

since there appears to be substantial inconsistency with
the coding of the weights often times Gallup's
/The basic unit sampled is a city block which
forms the basic cluster. One member of each household is
interviewed. These individuals are supposedly selected
In a random fashion. Source: personal communication with
Alec Gallup, American Institute of Public Opinion, Princeton,
New Jersey, June 11, 1970.
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Chi-square is used as the test of significance when
cross-tabulat)r analysis is used and the chi-square based
Cramer's V was used as a measure of association.

Although

more common statistics for measuring associations exist,
such as the Contingency Coefficient and Phi, Cramer's V
has a certain advantage.

Unlike C and Phi, which Cramer's

V is equal to in the case of 2 x 2 tables, V can achieve
unity when the number of rows and the number of columns
differ.

In the case of Cramer's V 1 is unity, 0 is

independence.
Another measure of association that was utilized
was Kruskal's Lambda.

Kruskal's Lambda, unlike Cramer's V,

is not based on chi-square.

Lambda is used to determine

the proportion of error of predicting the value of one
variable from a knowledge of another.

Like Cramer's V

value Lambda obtains unity at 1 and independence at 0.
The Lambda coefficient offers two major advantages that
other statistics do not possess:

(1)

There is no

limitation on number of rows and columns, and (2) The
categories can be ordered inany manner.4
Two other types of statistical methods were used
in addition to the ones mentioned in the foregoing
discussion.

A serial correlation was calculated so that

some determination of the effect of time on popular
4
Thomas Wm. Madron, Methods of Political Inouiry
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, in press,
Chapter
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measuring opinions on administration Vietnam policy.?
Secondly, It has been suggested that the question is
really measuring partisan affiliation.

Both criticisms

were investigated by running cross tabulations between
the "handling of the situation" question and the question
"Do you approve or disapprove of the way Johnson is
handling his job as President?" and those respondents
claiming to be Democrats.
TA3LE 11.1.

Gallup
Poll
Number

Relationship Between General Approval of the
President and Approval of His "handling of
the situation in Vietnam*.

Date

Chi-Square

Probability

Cramer's
V

Total
N

725

3/1/66

753.34a

0.0000b

.460°

3555

745

5/9/67

725.62

0.0000

.486

3076

760

4/2/68

555.34

0.0000

.607

1505

a
All chi-square values have been rounded to two
decimal places.
b
Probability vales have been rounded to four
decimal places.
°All Cramer's V values have been rounded to three
decimal places.
The chi-square values In Table 11.1 indicate a
significant relationship between general approval of the
7Sidney Verba et al., "Public Opinion and the War
in Vietnam," American Political Science Review, LXI
(June, 1967),

President
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Date
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Cramer's
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Probabilit
Total
y
706

2/17/65

725

3/1/66

745
760

5/9/67
4/2/68

64.14
131.49

70.51
58.25

0.0000
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

v

N

.260

1570

.192

3555
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3076
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1505
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The Cramer's V values, however, are so low that they
indicate virtually no strength of the relationship.
Consequently, the contention that partisan affiliation is
being measured by the "handling of the situation" question
seems invalid.
Since the "handling of the situation" question
mentions both variables (Presidential action and public
support) under investigation the natural inclination was
to use the question.

It was believed, however, that

although the association between the question and the
general approval question was not strong it was high
enough to require some explanation so that the use of the
"handling of the situation" Question could be justified.
If the reason for the general approval ratings
was approval of administration

Vietnam policy, then

obviously the "handling of the situation" question was
causing the relationsh:lp that was presented in Table 11.1.
This would appear to be the case in light of the findings
of Sidney Verba.

Verba found that Vietnam was a salient

problem and that the public possesses a relatively high

8
level of information on the issue.

Furthermore, the

issue was so salient that more people reported "worrying"
about Vietnam than four other major public issues.9

This

8Ibid., p. 31_9.
9Ibid. The four other public issues were Negro White relations, inflation and the cost of living, crime
and juvenile delinquency, and air and water pollution.

17
would indicate that the likelihood of approval of the
administration's Vietnam policy being a cause for general
support ratings was very great.

Therefore, the "handling

of the situation" question was used as a measure of
popular approval for the war.

Obviously there was a

certain element of faith involved in this choice.

The

findings, however, presented in Chapter IV would indicate
that that faith was not misplaced.

The Measurement of the Independent Variable
The question of what was to constitute a significant
Presidential action had to be ascertained.

This was

accomplished by selecting twenty-one actions that
represented a change in policy toward the war or a
reaffirmation of present policy.

A list of Presidential

actions was submitted to a panel of judges, all of which
hold Ph.D.'s in political science with their major field
being international relations.1°

They were asked to rate

each action on a one to five continuum as to its
significance.

The criteria used to determine if the action

or event was significant was to what extent a change in
policy or the reaffirmation of policy was broadcast over
nationwide television or widely disseminated in the press.
Five was considered to be very significant and one very
insignificant.
10
The panel was composed of Dr. Faye Carroll, Dr.
George Masanrat, and Dr. John Eley. All three are faculty
members in the Department of Government at Western Kentucky
University in Eowling Green, Kentucky.
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TABLE 11.3.

Significant Actions* and Factor Scores For
Each Action

Action:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Factor Score:

General military escalation
during June and July 1965.
(largest escalation to date)

4.229

U.S. and allies order thirty
hour bombing halt. (First
bombing halt since bombing
originally began) December, 1965.

3.342

U.S. is reportedly using
pause in bombing of N. Vietnam
to move toward peace talks.
(December, 1965)

2.277

Johnson pledges to stay in
Vietnam until aggression has
stopped. (State of the Union
message, 1966)

3.164

Budget message to Congress
lists cost of the war at
10.3 billion dollars (fiscal, 1967)
January, 1966.

1.675

U.S. resumes bombing after
thirty-seven day pause.
January, 1966

3.766

7.

Honolulu Conference
February, 1966

3.628

3.

U.S. planes carry out heaviest
bombardment of the war.
March, 1966

2.139

100,000 more U.S. troops
scheduled for arrival by
end of year bringing the
troop level to 400,000

2.701

10.

Increased air strikes over
N. Vietnam. June and July, 1966

2.139

11.

Presidential speech at
Omaha. June, 1966

2.741

9.

19
TAIlLE 11.3 (cont4)
Factor Scores:

Action:
12.

Manila Conference
October, 1966

3.628

"San Antonio Formula" given
in Presidential address
in Texas. September, 1967

3.628

President presents budget.
Estimated expenditure for
Vietnam is set at 4- 21.9 billion.
January, 1967

2.139

15.

Guam Conference October, 1966

3.628

16.

In a speech before Congress
General Westmoreland predicts
that U.S. forces will "prevail
in Vietnam over the Communist
aggressor." April, 1967

3.806

Johnson and Humphrey make separate
speeches affirming U.S. policy
in face of national demonstrations
opposing it. October, 1967

2.741

Johnson calls for peace, says
he would meet with Hanoi
leaders on neutral ship
in neutral waters. November, 1967

1.675

Presidential News Conference
November 17, 1967

2.139

Johnson says bombing would
stop if peace talks were to
take place nromptly and with
reasonable hopes they would
be productive. State of the Union
Message 1968

2.139

Johnson halts bombing of N. Vietnam
and announces he will not seek
reelection. March, 1968

4.831

13.

14.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

*Source:

1:ew York Times Index, 1965-1968.
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In an attempt to prevent biases that might result
from one judge's rating being at wide variance with
another a factor score was calculated for each action.

The

ratingson the one to five continuum were not dichotomized;
therefore, an ordinal level of measurement was used in
calculating the factor loadings.

It weuld have been more

desirable to have had the data on an interval level.

If

this had been done, however, much of the distinction
between ratings that was prevalent with a one to five
rating would have been lost.

Nonetheless in the calculation

of the factor scores a level of measurement was violated
and the reader should be aware of this in interpreting the
findings.
Correlation Matrix

TALE 11.4

1
1

1.00

3
.947
1.00

3

.980
.943
1.00

In order to obtain a factor score for each
observation (event or action in Table 11.3) a factor
weight was calculated for each of the judges rating of the
observation.

Table 11.4 is the correlation matrix used to

generate the factor loadings for each judge.
On the basis of the factor loadings for the judges
in Table 11.5 a factor score for each judge on each

21
observation was calculated.

The scores were added together

11
to form a factor score for the observation.

Each score

was assigned to the proper time period in which it fell
and a correlation was run between the ratings of President
Johnson on the "handling of the situation" question and
the scores for the significant events or actions.
Factor Loadings

TABLE 11.5

1

.973

2

.967
.974

11ror a general discussion of factor analysis
see Theodor D. Sterling and Seymour V. Pollack,
Introduction to Statistical Data Processing (Ehglewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 198), 481-484 and
Thomas '!:m. Madron, Methods of Political Inquiry
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, in press
Chapter VII.

CHAPTER III
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION AND POPULAR SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM
In this chapter the focus will be on an examination
of the null hypothesis that the relationship between
Presidential action and public support for the President
on matters of Vietnam policy is equal to zero.

In addition,

the results o2 tests run to determine the effect of the
"cost-of-living", time, and casualty rates on popular
approval of President Johnson's Vietnam policy will be
reported.
Many scholars have maintained that Presidential
action played a significant role in gaining President
Johnson support for his Vietnam policy.
3.

Certainly,

Lipset Is not the only one to put forth this thesis.1

The Question is of considerable importance; for if
Presidents are as free as this proposition would indicate,
then why was President Johnson unable to continually
maintain a level of strong support?
1See for example, William P. Gerbending, "Vietnam
and the Future of United States Foreign Policy," Virginia
Quarterly Review, XXXXIV (Winter, 1968), 41; E. Roper,
"Government by Opinion Polls," Saturday Review, Hay 28,
1966, 13; and Stuart G. Brown, 7ne American Presidency:
LeadershiD, Partisanship, and Popularity (ew York:
lacmillan Press, 1966)-, p. 253.
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It has been suFgested by students of public opinion
that "The first effect of an international crisis is to
increase the President's popular support."2

This phenomenon

has been labeled the "rally around the flag" effect and
appears to have existed in the early months of the Vietnam
conflict.3

Johnson's public approval ratings on the issue

of Vietnam, after this initial boost, did not start to
show any marked decline until approximately the end of
January, 1966.
:ietween early July of 1965 and late March of 1963
Johnson's ratings in the polls went from 485 to 26%.

The

intervening period witnessed many flucuations in the
support ratings.

In other words, his loss of support was

gradual not sudden.

The fluctuation along with some of

the important events of the war that occurred during the
period under discussion can be seen in Figure 111.1.

In

addition, Table 111.1 Rives a listing of the approval
percentages that appear on the graph (Figure III.1).
I. THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTION
The correlation that was used in deciding on
whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis was run
2
Kenneth N. 74altz, "Electoral Punishment and
Foreign Policy Crisis," in Domestic Sources of Foreign
Polio- , ed. by James N. Rosenau (Ne,,/ York: Free Press,
p. 273.
3John E. Dueller, "Presidential Popularity From
Truman to Johnson," American Political Science Review,
LXIV (March, 1970), 21.

General

I

seen

—tlan4le
confrence

'San Antonio"
47171rmataft
Presented; Offensive

Boming of i:orth
-Vietnam Stopped
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between the approval percentages listed in Table 111.1
and the factor scores in Table 11.3.

Before this was

done, however, a correlation was calculated using the
average raw score of the judges instead of the factor
scores.

The resulting correlation was .319.

The final

correlation using the factor scores yielded a value of
.311.

Using a coefficient of non-determination (1-r2)

one can see that approximately 90.3

of the common

variance is left unexplained when the effect of
Presidential action on Popular approval is measured.

On

a purely judgemental basis it does not appear that
Presidential action is very important in explaining
increases in popular support for the Administration's
war policy.

Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted.

Consequently, the question of whether President Johnson's
actions increased his popular support on the issue of
Vietna-1 will have to be answered in the negative.
It would appear from the findings that the
contention that popular approval for the war is a function
of Presidential action is -invalid.

Perhaps, however, the

proposition is true with respect to the early years of the
war.

This does not appear to be the case either, since

the correlation of the same variables for the period from
July, 1965, to December, 1966, is .263.

Likewise, a

correlation for the latter part of the war (January, 1967,
to :arch, 1963) of .239 indicates that only 65 of the
common variance is explained by Presidential action.
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TABLE 111.1.

Popular Approval* of President Johnson's
Handling of the Situation in Vietnam
(expressed in percentages)

Date:

Approval Ratinr:

Early July , 1965
Middle July
August
January, 1966
February
Early March
Late March
April
May
Early June
Late June
July
August
September
Early October
Late October
November
Early December
Late December
January, 1967
February
March
Early April
Late April
Early May
Late May
Early June
Late June
July
August
November
January, 1968
February
Early March
Late March
April

*Source: Gallup Poll Index, no.

48
52

57
56
57
50

56
54
47
41
40
49
43
43
42
44
43
43

41
33
39
37
42
39

43

33
41
43

33
33
35
39
35
32
26
41

35.
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Therefore, if the period under disc
ussion is taken in its
entirety, or divided, the resultin
g correlations are too
low to justify the rejection of
Ho.
Although other independent variable
s will be
examined later, the possibility
that increases in support
were the result of chance fac
tors should not be totally
disregarded. Some students of publ
ic opinion have
contended that casualty rates are
significant for purposes
of explaining declining approval
ratings.

Others have

suggested that rising prices in the
United States have
created disapproval of the war.

Poth of these variables,

along with the length of the war
, it was thought might
possibly explain some of the decl
ine of support.
II. THE EFFECT OF CASUALTY RATES, THE
"COST-OF-LIVING", AND TIME
In both Vietnam and Korea "support decl
ined as a
logarithmic function of American
casualties."4

This would

indicate that casualty rates have
had a significant effect
upon Public opinion. Two other vari
ables- time and the
"cost-of-living" -however, also
demonstrate a significant
relationship to public opinion on
the issue of Vietnam.
Vietnam has been the longeat war
in American
history.

Naturally, as time passes during a
war casualties

4
John E. Zueller, "Trends in Popu
lar Support for
the a_rs in Korea and Vietnam,"
(unpublished paper,
University of Rochester, 1969),
21.
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rise and the economic cost of the war increases.

In the

case of Vietnam the calculation of a serial correlation
of .991 suggest a strong relationship between time and
support for administration war policy.

Perhaps, the sheer

length of the war has given time for the various elements
of American society that oppose war in general to muster
their forces against the war in Vietnam.
Two arguments seem relevant in discussing the
effect of time and casualty rates.

First, time would

appear to be very significant; however, time by itself,
it could be hypothesized, explains very little.

Time

is probably best viewed as an independent variable that
facilitates the increased impact of other variables on
popular support for the war.

For instance s had the

American public perceived a steady chain of progress in
the war over the past five years the proposition that
disapproval of the war would have reached the magnitude
that it has would seem somewhat tenuous.

Therefore,

other variables need to be considered in order to
explain the time factor.

Secondly, there were periods

during the Vietnam war (August, 1966, to June, 1967)
in which casualty rates increased while support ratings
remained stable.

This certainly does not disprove the

importance of casualty rates; nor, does it validate
President Johnson's contention that increased casualty
rates would strengthen the will of the American public and,
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thereby, make them more determined to see the war
through.5

It does, however, cause one to speculate on

the importance of casualty rates on public opinion.
In 1967 the U. S. dead numbered 9,353 as compared
to 5,003 dead in 1966.

when viewed in terms of the overall

American population these figures are rather meager.

The

likelihood that large segments of American society were
effected in a personal manner is highly improbable.
Further, the one group-the young-who would possibly know
someone killed or wounded in Vietnam have throughout the
entire period demonstrated stronger support for the war
than any other age bracket.6
In addition to casualty rates and time, a variable
for the economic cost of the war must be introduced.

'line

Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan has
reported Vietnam to be a "most relevant variable . . . to
predict economic behavior."7

The findings of the SRC

study substantiate the importance of the economic variable.
A correlation between the consumer price index
5Reported in Lester Markel, "Public Opinion and
the War in Vietnam," New York Times 1.:agazine, August 8,
1965, p. 72.
6
Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Is )/ar a Mistake,"
Public Cpinion Ouarterlv, XVKIV (spring, 1970), 134.
?Reported in Robinson and Jacobson, "American
About Vietnam," 70-71.
Opinion
Public
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("cost-of-living") and popular approval yields an r of
-.793 which indicates that this variable explains
approximately 645 of the common variance (r2).

This

finding, however, must be viewed with some caution,
because the SRC survey noted above found 54% of their
respondents feeling that the war made for "good times".
Therefore, the effect of the "cost-of-living" on
increasing disapproval of the war might not be as great
as the correlation indicates.
Perhaps, all three variables - casualty rates,
time, and the "cost-of-living" - rather than having an
independent effect on popular approval for the war have
instead caused the issue to become more personalized.
The possible personalization of the issue, as was noted
in Chapter I, may have increased the saliency of the issue
to such a point that public opinion surrounding it
resembles public opinion on domestic rather than foreign
policy.

Therefore, the broader attribute of saliency

will be investigated in Chapter IV in terms of how this
characteristic of public opinion relates to the issue of
Vietnam.

CHAPTER IV
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION AND THE SALIENCY OF VIETNAM
The American people in the 1960's have exhibited a
deep concern about foreign policy.

Possibly, this is due to

the fact that virtually all Americans have come to realize
that international developments are likely to dramatically
affect their lives.1

The deep concern about foreign policy

has been present in the case of Vietnam.

This is evident

from the findings that were noted in Chapter III to the
effect that more people were reported worrying about
Vietnam than about four other major public issues.
If the war in Vietnam has been a salient issue over
time, then cuite possibly Vietnam might best be viewed as a
domestic issue-area or'
l the basis of the propositions stated
in Chapter I.

Furthermore, if a high degree of saliency has

been exhibited on the issue, then some explanation for
the
acceptance of the hypothesis that no relationship exists
between Presidential action and an increase in popular
support for the President on matters of Vietnam policy
can
be offered.

Since an increase in saliency would place the

Lloyd A. 7ree and Hadley Cantril, The Political
?eliefs of Americans (new Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1967), P. 58.
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Issue in the realm of domestic politics, then the
acceptance of Ho would be expected because it conforms to
the relationship between Presidential action and popular
support on matters of domestic politics.
If the issue has become salient enough to he a
determinant of general approval or disapproval of the
President, then possibly his ability to influence public
opinion would be diminished.

Therefore, in terms of

foreign policy and public opinion the question arises as
to whether opinions about Vietnam have had a significant
effect upon President Jchnson's general approval rating.
Some analysis has been conducted In which the
effect of Vietnam on general Presidential approval ratings
was measured.

One such study reached the conclusion that

the "Vietnam war had no independent impact on President
Johnson's popularity at,a11."2

This investigation was in

the form of a longitudinal analysis based on linear
reFression.

Therefore, in an attempt to test the saliency

of the Vietnam war for purposes of the present study and,
in addition, to attempt some validation of the
aforementioned conclusion some comparison over time was
sought.

Consequently, lambda values for the relationship

between general Presidential approval and approval of the
President's "handling of the situation in Vietnam" were
2 h
Jo n E. :::ueller, "Presidential Popularity From
Truman to Johnson," American Political Science Review,
LXIV (March, 1970), 29.
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calculated for three surveys-one survey each from 1966,
1967, and 1968.

The resulting values are presented in

Table IV.1.

TABLE IV.1.

Gallup
Poll
Number

Relationship between General Approval of
the President and Approval of His
"handling of the situation in Vietnam"
with Lambda Values

Lambda(a)

Lambda(b)

Lambda(ab)

Total N

725

.396

.373

.385

3555

745

.329

.426

.381

3076

760

.525

.595

.562

1505

All three studies indicate that opinions on Vietnam
are significant for

rposes of predicting general approval.

In the case of the lambda (a) values in every instance
one's error of predicting general approval from a knowledge
of the responses to the question "Do you approve or
disapprove of the way President Johnson is handling the
situation in Vietnam?" is reduced by at least 32.9%.

The

ability to reduce error in maing the inverse prediction,
on the basis of the lambda (b) value, is reduced by a

z-1

minimum of

37.35;.

The lambda (ab) values are high enough

to indicate a great deal of overlapping between the two
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variables.

:oreover, a clear indication of which is the
i,

most important variable cannot be ascertained from
Table IV.?.
Table IV.1 indicates, however, that Vietnam has
had an important effect on Presidential approval.
Furthermore, since the studies presented in Table IV.1
are taken from 1966, 1967, and 1968 the findings can be
interpreted as somewhat representative of the saliency of
the Vietnam issue over time.

The findings, however, so

:rnt
contradicted the contention that Vietnam had no independ
effect on Presidential approval that some validation of
them was sought.
In Gallup Poll 725, which was conducted in early
1966 the standard general Presidential approval/disappl-oval
question was asked.

In addition to this question a further

query asking the respondents to state the reason for their
approval or disapproval was posed.

By calculating a

multiple-r on the reasons given for disapproval versus
those who disapproved an indication of the importance of
Vietnam as a reason for disapproval was ascertained.

The

reasons for disapproval and their corresponding multiple-r
values are presented in Table IV.2.
The multiple-r values demonstrate the relative
importance of each resnonse in terms of the amount of
variance explained.

For instance, "Dislike General: Could

handle the situation better," is the most important reason
for disapproval and explains 41.4q of the variance.
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TABLE I1.2.

Relationship Petween General Disapproval of
the President and Reasons for Disappro‘al

Item:

•

Multiple-r

Dislike General: Could handle
situation better

.414

Disapprove of the way Johnson
Is handlin the situation
in Vietnam

.563

Spending too much money, z.eneral

.667

Too much power; Feels he doesn't
have to answer to anyone

.716

Are concerned about the Vietnam
situation

.759

Too liberal; "Leans toward
socialism," "we're heading
toward socialism," etc.

•739

Civil Rights

.316

Not strong enough leader; too
easily influenced, too weak

.841

Feel we should step up our effort
in Vietnam, zo all out

.853

Anti-Poverty Program

.572

Disapprove of foreign policy
(general)

.832

Feel we should make peace - get
out of Vietnam

.592

Disapprove of domestic Policy
(general)

.396

Medicare

.396

Source: A. I. P. 0. 725, 3/116.
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Moreover, when the reason "Disapprove of the way Johnson
is handling the situation in Vietnam," is added to the
regression 56.3% of the variance is explained.

By the

time five of the fourteen items have been added 75.1% of
the variance has been explained.

Of particular importance

is that among the first five items two of them are related
to Vietnam.
4

Furthermore, the one specific item that

contributes the most to the regression in terms of
predictive ability Is the reason: "Disapprove of the way
Johnson is handling the situation in Vietnam."

Therefore,

as was noted in the cRse of the lambda values in
in
Table IV.1, Vietnam has a high degree of usefulness
terms of predictive ability.

It should be noted that the

offer
multiple-r values are from one survey and, therefore,
little in the way of analysis of the predictive ability
of the Vietnam issue over time.

The multiple-r values

serve as a validity check on the findings presented in
Table IV.1.
All of the findings Presented in this chapter
strongly contradict the contention that Vietnam has had
no independent effect on Presidential approval ratings.
:oreover, they indicate a high degree of saliency on the
Issue, even higher than most major domestic issues as can
be seen from Vietnam's relative importance to domestic
issues in Table IV.2.
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The high degree of saliency offers some explanation
for the acceptance of Ho in Chapter III.

Furthermore, it

could be hypothesized that time, casualty rates, and the
"cost-of-living" have contributed to increased saliency
by causing the issue to become personalized.
Both the lack of a significant relationship
between Presidential action and Popular support for Vietnam
policy and the high degree of saliency exhibited on the
issue Possess important implications for the theory of
domestic-foreign policy issue-areas.
will be the topic of the next chapter.

These implications

CHAPTER V
•

SUARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter III two basic conclusions were reached.
First, it was discovered that Presidential action was not a
significant factor in explaining increases in popular
support for President Johnson's Vietnam policy.

Furthermore,

it was noted that the relationship was not significant for
either the entire period under investigation or when the
period was divided.

Therefore, the conclusion was reached

that Presidential action Ilad no sianificant effect on
popular approval ratings for President Johnson's Vietnam
policy in either the earlier or latter period of the war.
Secondly, the length of the war, casualty rates, and the
"cost-of-living" were found to be sianificantly related
to declining support.

It was not, however, in the scope

of the present study to investigate the independent effect
these variables might have had on declining support.
Moreover, it was hypothesized in Chapter IV that the
effect was, in all probability, cumulative in nature and
explained, in part, the high degree of saliency found on
the issue of Vietnam.
The hiah degree of saliency on the issue of Vietnam
can be explained as beinc a function of the personalization
of the issue.

As the len:7th of the war and casualty rates
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increased the likelihood that the American people would view
the conflict as encroaching on their immediate environment
was heightened.

In addition, the increases in the cost of

the war coupled with the rising "cost-of-living" probably
increased the possibility that the issue of Vietnam would
become personalized.
On the basis of the domestic-foreign policy
issue-area model and the research conducted in the area of
foreign policy and public opinion cited in Chapter I some
indication as to the manner in which public opinion on the
Issue of Vietnam should be studied can be ascertained.

It

was proposed that domestic issues are generally more salient
than foreign policy issues.

In the case of Vietnam this Is

not the conclusion that has been reached.

loreover,

was

found that Vietnam was more salient than several major
domestic issues.

For purposes of studying the war and

public opinion the implication is that Vietnam should be
viewed as a domestic issue-area.

Obviously, from the

standpoint of formal decision making processes Vietnam
is foreign policy.

The conclusion, however, is that the

American people have reacted to the issue of Vietnam
more in the manner that would be expected on a domestic
issue.
Another indication that Vietnam has evoked a reaction
from the public that conforms more to what would be
expected in a domestic issue-area has been their response
to Presidential action.

Xoreover, the American people's
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approval of the President's Vietnam policy has not been
significantly determined over time by Presidential action
on the issue.

This, consequently, lends credence to the

contention that Vietnsm should be viewed as a domestic
issue-area.
In order to rigidly maintain the position that
Vietnam and its relation to public opinion should be
examined as a domestic issue-area the effect of other
variables on Popular approval ratings need to be
investigated.

For instance, it is believed that one

important variable would be organized opposition.
Particularily interesting in this respect would be the
nature of that opposition in terms of its size and
structure.

For if opposition was large and activated

opinion-leaders who were not normally activated on issues
of foreign policy, then some conclusion could be reached
as to whether the opinion process was horizontal as
would be expected in the case of a domestic issue.

This

would aid in further explaining the manner in which public
opinion on ViPtnam should be studied.
Until such time as other elements of the
domestic-foretgn policy issue-area model are related to
the study cb "public opinion and the issue of Vietnam
the conclusion that Vietnam should be studied as a
domestic issue-area will have to remain tentative.
Consequently, the contribution of the present study to

public opinion research will be ascertained in terms of
research that has not yet been undertaken.
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